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Introduction
Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election in the United States of 2016 
was a huge surprise for many. The mainstream media on both sides of the Atlan-
tic could not understand how this controversial and extravagant billionaire won 
the race to the White House. Many progressive environments and mainstream 
media started to claim that Trump’s success testifi es to the xenophobic disease 
of the American society, completely ignoring the socio-economic sources of 
the victory of the American Right.2 In addition, some commentators began to 
undermine the outcome of the election, noting that Hillary Clinton had almost 
1 This article is a development of the text entitled “Jak sieroty po amerykańskiej lewi-
cy dały zwycięstwo Trumpowi” published in Pressje 2016, Vol. 47–48, pp. 66–70. The author 
also wrote about the anti-globalization phenomenon of Donald Trump in: B. Rydliński, “Trump 
antyglobalista? Znaczenie przegranych amerykańskiego kapitalizmu w wyborach prezydenckich 
2016 roku”, [in:] Autorytarny populizm w XXI wieku. Krytyczna rekonstrukcja, ed. F. Pierzchalski, 
B. Rydliński, Warszawa 2017, pp. 201–213.
2 Some experts claimed even that Trump’s victory is the beginning of authoritarianism 
in the United States. Cf. R. Kowalski, “Graff  o zaprzysiężeniu Trumpa: ‘Dziś ostatni dzień świata 
liberalnej demokracji’”, Krytyka Polityczna, 19.01.2017, http://krytykapolityczna.pl/multimedia/












3 million more votes than her Republican competitor, ignoring the fact, that the 
rules of the game were clear to both sides and the U.S. election system played in 
favor of Donald Trump.3 And it is in the voting results from the post-industrial 
states that one should seek the answer to the question concerning the extent to 
which Trump’s victory is connected above all with the failure of the American 
center-left in the fi elds of economic and social policy. In addition, this analysis 
should be seen as a part of a wider phenomenon of the traditional Left-wing 
voters’ shift to right-wing populism, which currently appears as a clear and 
credible anti-globalization force. In my view, the American losers of the neolib-
eral processes of globalization of economies and opening up new economic and 
customs borders turned out to be one of the key social groups that decided about 
the electoral success of the CEO of the Trump Organization. In order to verify 
the posed hypothesis, the author of this article will use the method of qualitative 
discourse analysis when examining the political language of Donald Trump, 
quantitative, historical and comparative methods while demonstrating electoral 
changes in the north-eastern states commonly referred to as the Rust Belt. The 
article combines the approach of the theory of aggregative democracy and ra-
tional choice theory implemented in the fi eld of electoral behavior analysis.
An unfi nished crisis
In the beginning of this article, I shall focus on the signifi cance of the 2008 
crisis for American politics. This is important because many glorifi ers of neo-
liberalism and the pre-crisis status quo of the global “casino capitalism” tried 
to convince the public that the crisis was over, that the U.S. and world economy 
was coming out of the depression, and that next time Wall Street gamblers 
would be more prudent in their plots and speculations. Of course, such calls 
were unlikely to impress those who, as taxpayers, rescued American banks, 
beguiled with the lack of alternatives for bailouts and the fear of losing the li-
on’s share of their “invested” pensions on the market. These people have given 
signs of their anger again and again. First, by choosing Barack Obama, who 
in the year of the crisis had emerged, promised that his administration will 
make signifi cant changes in the U.S. economic system (“Change”), and that 
they can certainly aff ord it (“Yes we can”). Then the rescuers of the American 
fi nancial empires began to articulate their indignation against the injustice that 
surrounded them. The catchphrase “We are 99%” and the call for the U.S. gov-
ernment to save indebted American students, not the banking sector, roared 
3 Cf. N. Wing, “Final Popular Vote Total Shows Hillary Clinton Won Almost 3 Million 
More Ballots Than Donald Trump”, Huff post, 20.12.2016, https://www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/entry/
hillary-clinton-popular-vote_us_58599647e4b0eb58648446c6 [accessed: 27.12.2017].
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near the New York stock exchange in the Zuccotti Park in 2011.4 The Occupy 
Wall Street movement, unlike the mainstream part of the American Left, drew 
attention to the fundamental problem of the USA: glaring socio-economic dis-
proportions, harmful eff ects of the marketization of education and the need for 
more radical steps by the Obama administration. The last manifestation of the 
growing political frustration of the American Left was the unexpected political 
success of Bernie Sanders in the primaries of the Democratic Party. This at the 
time 75-year-old senator from Vermont hit the front pages of newspapers and 
online portals. Proudly calling himself a democratic socialist, he became a seri-
ous threat to Hillary Clinton in the race for the nomination of the Democratic 
Party. He vigorously argued that the United States needed a political revolu-
tion, he underlined very clearly that “people are tired of establishment policy 
and want a real change!”.5 He called his opponent out on her connections with 
American fi nanciers. Sanders himself did not collect donations from million-
aires for his election campaign. It was based on small payments from millions 
of his supporters.
Sanders was, in a sense, a complete opposite of Hillary Clinton. Like Don-
ald Trump, he was an anti-establishment candidate. For years he remained a po-
litical outsider in Congress, he voted against the American aggression against 
Iraq, supported war veterans, he spoke directly about the corruption-based sys-
tem of lobbying on the Capitol Hill. As revealed by WikiLeaks, the Democratic 
National Committee did everything in its power to prevent Sanders from being 
nominated for the offi  ce of the President of the United States.6 Thus, the Demo-
cratic Party made a strategic mistake, because, as analyses show, the popular 
Bernie Sanders could not only fi ght with Donald Trump, but also win the 2016 
presidential election.7
Policy of language – language of policy. Donald Trump’s anti-globalism
Sanders brought a strongly anti-neoliberal language to the American public de-
bate. He rightly pointed out that contemporary globalization, contrary to what its 
4 Cf. B. Rydliński, „Specyfi ka ruchu ‘Occupy’”, Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologicz-
ne 2012, Vol. 36, pp. 302–313.
5 Real Change. Bernie Sanders, 1.11.2015, https://youtu.be/hwwwn9zHT-8 [accessed: 
27.12.2017].
6 “Leaked DNC Emails Reveal Details of Anti-Sanders Sentiment”, The Guardian, 
24.07.2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/23/dnc-emails-wikileaks-hillary-ber-
nie-sanders [accessed: 27.12.2017].
7 Cf. Z. Cartwright, “If Anyone Doubts Bernie Sanders Would’ve Crushed Trump, 




followers claim, does not make everyone prosper better.8 In spite of obvious ideo-
logical and class diff erences, Sanders and Trump spoke about similar problems 
of the United States. They were both candidates of the losers of the processes of 
trade liberalization, who did not benefi t from the opening of customs borders and 
negative changes in the labor market. Of course, Donald Trump will never be 
considered a politician of the idea of progress, if only because of his xenophobic, 
sexist and demagogic views as well as belonging to a group of hypercapitalists. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Trump managed to fi ll the political void left 
after Sanders and how his anti-globalization narrative propelled him to a spec-
tacular victory over Hillary Clinton, with a particular emphasis on the Rust Belt.
This is how the upcoming 45th president of the United States, defi ned his 
view of the globalization in April 2016 when presenting his key remarks on 
U.S. foreign policy:
Americans must know that we are putting the American people fi rst again on trade. So true. 
On trade, on immigration, on foreign policy. The jobs, incomes and security of the Ameri-
can worker will always be my fi rst priority. No country has ever prospered that failed to 
put its own interests fi rst. Both our friends and our enemies put their countries above ours 
and we, while being fair to them, must start doing the same. We will no longer surrender 
this country or its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state remains the true 
foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions that tie us 
up and bring America down and will never enter. And under my administration, we will 
never enter America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own aff airs. 
NAFTA, as an example, has been a total disaster for the United States and has emptied our 
states – literally emptied our states of our manufacturing and our jobs. And I’ve just gotten 
to see it. I’ve toured Pennsylvania. I’ve toured New York. I’ve toured so many of the states. 
They have been cleaned out. Their manufacturing is gone. Never again, only the reverse – 
and I have to say this strongly – never again; only the reverse will happen. We will keep our 
jobs and bring in new ones. There will be consequences for the companies that leave the 
United States only to exploit it later. They fi re the people. They take advantage of the United 
States. There will be consequences for those companies. Never again. Under a Trump ad-
ministration, no American citizen will ever again feel that their needs come second to the 
citizens of a foreign country. I will view as president the world through the clear lens of 
American interests. I will be America’s greatest defender and most loyal champion. We will 
not apologize for becoming successful again, but will instead embrace the unique heritage 
that makes us who we are.9
We see in the above statement a clearly put diagnosis regarding the per-
nicious impact of the opening of markets and borders for the American soci-
ety. The ending of jobs as a result of the NAFTA agreement from the United 
States to much poorer Mexico was already described in 1999 by the icon of the 
8 Cf. B. Rydliński, “‘Amerykański (socjalistyczny) sen’ Berniego Sandersa”, Studia Kry-
tyczne/Critical Studies 2016, Vol. 2, p. 181.
9 “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech”, The New York Times, 27.04.2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html [accessed: 
27.12.2017].
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Anglo-Saxon New Left, Naomi Klein, in her legendary book No Logo.10 One of 
the leading fi gures behind the implementation of this agreement was Bill Clinton, 
the 42nd President of the United States and husband of Trump’s opposing candi-
date, who could not clearly specify her views on the issue of this trade agreement. 
Trump certainly appeared as a defender of the losers of neoliberal globalization, 
who not only wants to conservatively defend the rest of jobs in American indus-
try, but also announces a return to a policy based on defense of the economic 
national interest and turning away from the dogmatic faith in the positive eff ects 
of the “globalization” of the U.S. economy.
We witnessed a similar procedure of Donald Trump during his fi rst presi-
dential election debate with Hillary Clinton, which took place on September 26, 
2016 at the Hofstra University in New York. The Republican candidate ruthlessly 
accused his competitor in the race to the White House that, like her husband, she 
completely misunderstood the negative consequences of neoliberal globalization:
Your husband signed NAFTA, which was one of the worst things that ever happened to the 
manufacturing industry. You go to New England, you go to Ohio, Pennsylvania, you go 
anywhere you want, Secretary Clinton, and you will see devastation where manufacture 
is down 30, 40, sometimes 50 percent. NAFTA is the worst trade deal maybe ever signed 
anywhere, but certainly ever signed in this country. And now you want to approve Trans-
Pacifi c Partnership. You were totally in favor of it. Then you heard what I was saying, how 
bad it is, and you said, I can’t win that debate. But you know that if you did win, you would 
approve that, and that will be almost as bad as NAFTA. Nothing will ever top NAFTA.11
Trump in an effi  cient way not only pointed to Clinton’s uncertainty about 
key globalist trade agreements, but also politically empowered the inhabitants of 
the Rust Belt, whose political choices became the symbol of a signifi cant political 
change that we observed on November 8, 2016, a key to understand the problem 
highlighted in the title of this article.
What’s the Matter with the Rust Belt?
To this question, we are immediately reminded of the 2004 book by Thomas 
Frank about the departure of traditional Left-wing voters in the state of Kan-
sas in favor of Right-wing populists.12 In a sense, we observed a similar pro-
cess during the last presidential election, in which the vast majority of white 
working-class voters from the working class from the Midwest and Great Lakes 
10 Cf. N. Klein, No Logo, 10th Anniversary Edition, New York 2009, s. 223–226, 231–257.
11 “The First Trump-Clinton Presidential Debate Transcript, Annotated”, The Wash-
ington Post, 26.09.2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fi x/wp/2016/09/26/
the-fi rst-trump-clinton-presidential-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.a51ec2b6603c [ac-
cessed: 27.12.2017].
12 Cf. Th. Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of 
America, New York 2004.
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massively voted for Donald Trump13, who for various reasons could not be 
considered their natural representative. The current president of the USA is the 
richest person in this offi  ce in the entire history of the United States14, unlike the 
inhabitants of the Rust Belt, he did not struggle with the problem of structural 
unemployment, the fall of the American dream, or observe the progressing de-
generation of his workplace, neighborhood, city and state.15 It is worth asking 
ourselves, what has happened, in recent years, that the “solid voters” of the 
Democrats decided to punish the center-left. In order to complete the picture 
of the described changes and the scale of the phenomenon, it is worth quoting 
a few facts from the electoral geography of the Rust Belt. Less than a decade 
ago almost all states from that region – except for West Virginia – voted for 
Barack Obama by giving him in the 2008 election 138 electoral votes for 270 
needed to take the presidency.16 Four years later, Indiana joined the group of 
Republican states in the Rust Belt, transferring their support from Barack Oba-
ma to Mitt Romney.17 In 2016, however, in the election between Hillary Clinton 
and Donald Trump, we witnessed a real political revolution. Only the states of 
Illinois and New York supported the Democratic candidate and the majority of 
voters from Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa and Wisconsin voted for the 
fl amboyant candidate of the Republican Party.
In order to show the fundamental changes in the election behavior in the 
Rust Belt we should compare two particular states – Iowa and Ohio, which both 
have changed their election preferences during the last 8 years. In so far as 2008 
54% of voters in Iowa supported Barack Obama (the Republican John McCain got 
44.7% of the votes18), in November 2016 Donald Trump got 51.8% and Hillary 
Clinton 42.2%.19 Thus, we can observe a mirroring reversal of the proportions of 
support. A more symbolic diff erence can be observed in the analysis of votes in 
the particular counties. 2008 in 52 out of 99 counties voted for the candidate from 
13 Cf. N. Cohn, “Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites”, The New York Times, 
9.11.2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/why-trump-won-working-class-whites.
html [accessed: 3.01.2018].
14 Cf. E. Martin, “Donald Trump Is Offi  cially the Richest US President In History”, Busi-
ness Insider, 23.01.2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-richest-us-president-in-
history-2017-1?IR=T [accessed: 27.12.2017].
15 One of the most symbolic reportage on city degeneration is entitled The Ruins of Detroit, 
http://www.marchandmeff re.com/detroit [accessed: 27.12.2017].
16 Election Results 2008. President Map, The New York Times, 9.12.2008, https://www.
nytimes.com/elections/2008/results/president/map.html [accessed: 27.12.2017].
17 Election 2012. President Map, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/elec-
tions/2012/results/president.html [accessed: 27.12.2017].
18 Election Results 2008. President Map, op. cit.
19 2016 Presidential Election Results, Politico, 13.12.2016, https://www.politico.com/map-
data-2016/2016-election/results/map/president/ [accessed: 27.12.2017].
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the Democrats20, whereas 8 years later Hillary Clinton won in only 6 counties.21 
Especially symbolic is the defeat of Hillary Clinton in the East, post-industrial 
part of this state, which is part of the Rust Belt, which 2008 almost entirely voted 
for the fi rst black president of the United States and in the last elections showed 
the red card to the Democratic Party by supporting Donald Trump.
The situation in Ohio was very similar – ten years ago the majority of votes 
went to Barack Obama and gave him victory with 51.2% of votes in comparison 
to 47.2% for the candidate of the right22, whereas it changed its preferences in 
2016 to 52.1% for Donald Trump and 43.5% for Hilary Clinton.23 Looking at the 
counties we also can observe shifts: 2008 the candidate of the Democrats won 
in 22 out of 88 counties, whereas in 2016 the candidate from the same party got 
only 7 counties.24
The Rust Belt in election of 2016 gave Trump 86 electoral votes and 
only 49 for Clinton.25 We see, therefore, that during three cycles of presidential 
elections, post-working-class states from the Democratic stronghold became 
a reservoir of support for the American Right. Why has this happened and what 
does this mean for the American Left? These questions can be answered in 
many ways taking into account both the American and transatlantic specifi city 
of progressive groups.
Self-imposed defeat?
Since the 1968 revolution the American Left continues to have a problem with 
answering the question of what is the most important aspect of its political 
strategy. Are those the cultural issues or the struggle for the economic interest 
of those social classes which constituted the natural electoral base of the Demo-
cratic Party? The collapse of the bipolar world in 1989–1991 and the triumph of 
a neoliberal idea fettered with liberal democracy further infl uenced the Amer-
ican and European Left. Clinton’s political approach above Left and Right, 
Blair and Giddens’s the “New Third Way” and Gerhard Schröder’s Neue Mitte 
proved to be a worse cure than for the disease that consumed the progressive 
20 Election Results 2008. Iowa: Presidential County Results, The New York Times, 
9.12.2008, https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/results/states/president/iowa.html [accessed: 
27.12.2017].
21 2016 Iowa Presidential Election Results, Politico, 13.12.2016, https://www.politico.
com/2016-election/results/map/president/iowa/ [accessed: 3.01.2018].
22 Election Results 2008. President Map, op. cit.
23 2016 Presidential Election Results, op. cit.
24 2016 Ohio Presidential Election Results, Politico, 13.12.2016, https://www.politico.
com/2016-election/results/map/president/ohio/ [accessed: 3.01.2018].
25 2016 Presidential Election Results, op. cit.
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political parties on both sides of the Atlantic.26 Admittedly, temporarily adopt-
ing the free market narrative allowed the American Democrats and European 
Social Democrats to achieve spectacular election results at the turn of the cen-
tury, in the second decade of the 21st century, the same phenomenon turned 
out to be one of the most serious crises in the history of the Western Left. The 
unemployed of the former U.S. industrial districts, former workers’ settlements 
in the United Kingdom, victims of transitional deindustrialization from Central 
and Eastern Europe are today the core of Right-wing populism, not Left-wing 
groups. This is currently one of the most discussed political phenomena in re-
cent years.
One way of interpreting this fact is the wrong choice of political strat-
egy on the part of the American (but also the European) Left. It involves a fo-
cus on cultural rather than socio-economic cleavages. Instead of the protec-
tion of economically worse-paid classes and losers of globalization, we have 
been witnessing the “rainbovization” of the Left in the recent years. Cultural 
issues and the struggle for the rights of all minorities have overshadowed the 
working class and their demands. As a result of the processes of globalization 
and the liberalization of markets, this class began to shrink at an unexpectedly 
fast pace. On the other hand, the newly-formed precariat class had no crystal-
lized political awareness – as is the case in Central Europe – or as it is in the 
U.S. those people see in the center-left cynicism, lack of ideology and servility 
towards Wall Street, and thus avoid siding with the “old” Left. In addition, vot-
ers who have lost their stable jobs in the industry by moving from the working 
class to unemployment do not see in the parties a progressive force that is able 
to solve their problems, but one that is part of the political establishment, which 
is responsible for this fatal state of aff airs. At this point, it is worth pointing out 
the fundamentally misguided political strategy of Hillary Clinton and the entire 
American centrist Left based on the concept of Identity Liberalism. As Mark 
Lilla points out in the New York Times, the belief that the mere fact of being 
an African American, gay, lesbian, Latin American, and a woman constitutes 
an important political and election motivation proved extremely wrong, be-
cause the class and economic confl ict of interest still remain the key electoral 
motivation.27
26 It is good to underline, that from the very beginning of “New Third Way”/Neue Mitte we 
witnessed serious voice of criticism on those doctrines. For example, the Polish economist Tadeusz 
Kowalik was on one of the fi rst Central European scholars, who published very detailed anti-Third 
Way scientifi c statement. Cf. T. Kowalik, „Posłowie: spory wokół Trzeciej Drogi”, [in:] Spory 
wokół Nowej Trzeciej Drogi, ed. idem, Warszawa 2001, pp. 121–147.
27 Cf. M. Lilla, “The End of Identity Liberalism”, The New York Times, 18.11.2016, https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html?_r=0 [ac-
cessed: 27.12.2017].
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There is no alternative! Democratic socialism!
By its very nature, Identity Politics is a concept that is not only extremely indi-
vidualistic, but also favors particular social groups to which it is addressed. The 
previously mentioned Mark Lilla puts it in the following way, pointing at the 
negative political consequences for the American Left resulting from the fetishiz-
ing of the concept:
In recent years American liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, 
gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from 
becoming a unifying force capable of governing […] If you are going to mention groups 
in America, you had better mention all of them. If you don’t, those left out will notice and 
feel excluded. Which, as the data show, was exactly what happened with the white working 
class and those with strong religious convictions. Fully two-thirds of white voters without 
college degrees voted for Donald Trump, as did over 80 percent of white evangelicals.28
At this point, it is worth pointing out the lack of an alternative for the Left, 
if it wants to both survive and relate to political and electoral successes in the 
future it can use only one cure. This cure is democratic socialism.
This idea was inseparably connected with the desire to combine the con-
cept of democracy understood as the power of the people combined with the 
supremacy of the idea of civil liberties and socialism defi ned as a system of uni-
versal social benefi ts and social control over economic processes. This concept, 
especially in the last months is gaining popularity in Anglo-Saxon countries 
thanks to Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn, who appear not only as symbols 
of Left-wing credibility, but also unrelenting ideologists in the time of the fall 
of all political values.29 The reliability of their activities, devotion to the aff airs 
of the losers and the conviction about the moral superiority of the socialist idea 
over bloodthirsty capitalism in the neoliberal version constitute their political 
strength. The lesson from the United States is, therefore, extremely universal for 
the entire transatlantic Left. It turns out that the losers of globalization processes, 
disappointed with the center-left policy of representing the Wall Street and not 
the Main Street, decide to protest by choosing eccentric Right-wing populists 
as their representatives. If the Left wants to regain their trust in the future, it 
must once again put a red banner, abandon centrism and trust their experts, who 
have been indicating for years that emotions, values and confl icts of interest are 
permanently inscribed in the political system, in which we currently operate. As 
Chantal Mouff e rightly notes “Such a democracy will therefore always be a de-
mocracy ‘to come’, as confl ict and antagonism are at the same time its condition 
28 Ibidem.
29 Cf. Corbyn, Sanders – przebudzenie socjalizmu? 30.03.2016. Część 1, 2.04.2016, https://
youtu.be/GgeSTJeWcEM; Corbyn, Sanders – przebudzenie socjalizmu? 30.03.2016. Część 2, 
2.04.2016, https://youtu.be/swzhpK3N0lA [accessed: 27.12.2017].
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of possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full realization”.30 The Left, 
remaining on the current conceptual positions, will continue to contribute to the 
end of the political reality as we know it and could bring even worse crises in the 
near future.
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Zwycięstwo Donalda Trumpa jako symbol porażki (centro)lewicy 
w Stanach Zjednoczonych
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza zwycięstwa Donalda Trumpa w wyborach prezydenckich 
w Stanach Zjednoczonych w 2016 roku w kontekście porażki projektu centro-lewicowego w tym 
kraju. Szczególna uwaga zostanie poświęcona geografi i wyborczej tzw. Pasa Rdzy, który stanowi 
jeden z najbardziej symbolicznych regionów Ameryki, w którym możemy zaobserwować negatyw-
ne konsekwencje neoliberalnej globalizacji. Autor artykułu skupi się także na języku politycznym 
Donalda Trumpa, silnym przekazie antyglobalistycznym użytym przez republikańskiego kandyda-
ta zarówno w czasie prawyborów, jaki i podczas debat prezydenckich z Hillary Clinton. Studium 
zaprezentuje także na ile „polityka tożsamości” oraz inne indywidualistyczne koncepty wpłynęły 
na porażkę wyborczą amerykańskiej lewicy oraz dlaczego bardziej kolektywne i antagonistyczne 
podejście może w przyszłości mieć pozytywny wpływ na cały transatlantycki ruch postępowy.
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Donald Trump’s Victory as a Symbol of (Center)left Failure 
in the United States
The aim of this article is the analysis of Donald Trump’s electoral victory in U.S. presidential elec-
tions of 2016 in the context of failure of the center-left in this country. Special attention will be paid 
to political geography of the Rust Belt, one of the most symbolic regions in America, where one 
can observe the negative consequences of neoliberal globalization. The author of the article will 
focus on the political language of Donald Trump and the strong anti-globalist statement used by 
the Republican candidate during primaries as well during presidential debates with Hillary Clinton. 
This study will also show, how Identity Politics and other idealistic concepts infl uenced the elec-
toral defeat of the American Left and why a more collective and antagonistic approach could have 
a positive impact on the whole transatlantic progressive movement. 
Key words: Trump, Left, Anti-globalism, Rust Belt, Democratic Socialism
